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Shakespeare’s Hamlet is, among other things, an agonized meditation on conflicting early 
modern conceptions of human nature, a preoccupation signalled by persistent anthropological 
generalizations.1 Yet, despite this insistent emphasis on “man,” Shakespeare’s view of human 
nature in the play seems ambivalent; it is perhaps the safest path to argue that the implied 
anthropology of Hamlet is paradoxical, both affirming  optimistic classical-humanist 
commonplaces and subverting them by voicing radical pessimism, doubt, and uncertainty.  
This sense of irresolution can be illustrated by the play’s most memorable statement about 
human nature. Having characterized the earth as simultaneously a “goodly frame” and “sterile 
promontory,” and the atmosphere as both an “excellent canopy” and a “foul and pestilent 
congregation of vapors” (2.2.299, 302-3), Hamlet turns his attention to the enigma of humanity: 
“What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and 
moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god; 
the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals – and yet, to me, what is this quintessence of 
                     
1 Here are some examples: “He was a man, take him for all in all” (1.2.187); “apparel oft 
proclaims the man” (1.3.72); “As infinite as man may undergo” (1.4.34); “Every man has 
business and desire” (1.5.136); : “to be honest as this world goes, is to be one man picked out of 
ten thousand” (2.2.177-8);  “Use every man after his desert, and who shall scape whipping” 
(2.2.524-5); “What should such fellows  as I do crawling between earth and heaven? We are 
arrant knaves all” (3.1.128-9); “To give the world assurance of a man” (3.4.62); “What is a man” 
(4.4.33); “a man’s life’s no more than to say ‘one’” (5.2.74); “to know a man well, were to know 
himself” (5.2.137-8). All quotations from Hamlet are from The Arden Edition, i.e. William 
Shakespeare, Hamlet, Ed. Harold Jenkins, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1982) and refer to Act, 
scene, and line numbers. 
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dust? Man delights not me…” (2.2.303-9). The passage’s judgment on human nature is 
suspended between a Piconian exaltation of human potential and a Montaignean anti-humanism 
which denies human exceptionalism. The gap between the two accounts is not attributable to any 
new datum – e.g. the new science, Copernican cosmology, etc. – but by an apparent rupture 
between the objective and subjective. Hamlet knows (or at least used to believe) that human 
beings are magnificent creatures living in a majestic cosmos; this judgment seems sufficiently 
universal and objective. Yet, having mysteriously lost his mirth, Hamlet now perceives 
otherwise: “seems to me,” “it appeareth nothing to me,” “yet, to me” (2.2.298-9, 301-2, 308).  
Like Montaigne, whom Shakespeare read closely, Hamlet pits the authority of the perceiving 
human subject against received opinion, even to the point of solipsism: “The world always looks 
straight ahead; as for me, I turn my gaze inward, I fix it there and keep it busy. Everyone looks in 
front of him; as for me, I look inside of me; I have no business but with myself; I continually 
observe myself, I take stock of myself, I taste myself.”2  
Given the volume and degree of disagreement among the play’s critical commentators, as 
well as the play’s thematization of irresolution,3 it is tempting to play it safe and call Hamlet’s 
anthropology irresolvably paradoxical. But I don’t believe this does justice to the text, which 
contains three distinct strands in its exploration of the theme of human nature: 1) an articulation 
of  Piconian optimism, coalescing in the figure of homo rationalis – man as the rational or 
thinking animal; 2) a skeptical Montaignean critique of homo rationalis; 3) the proposal of an 
                     
2 Michel de Montaigne, “Of Presumption,” trans. Donald M. Frame, in The Complete Essays of 
Montaigne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), . 499. 
3 The play is notoriously resistant to definitive interpretation. Moreover it dramatizes suspension 
of judgment and action. One thinks for example of the emblematic poised over the prone body of 
Priam, Pyrrhus, who, “like a neutral to his will and matter,/ Did nothing”  (2.2.477-8), or of the 
guilt-ridden Claudius’s self-description: “like a man to double business bound,/ I stand in pause 
where I shall first begin,/ And both neglect” (3.4.41-3).  
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unlikely alternative model, homo histrio4 – man the actor – which, while conceding the 
Montaignean critique in many respects, nevertheless recuperates Piconian ideals in an 
unexpected form. Hamlet shifts the focus from human nature per se to the human condition; the 
play explores the multiple ways that theatricality, a human invention, has entered into the human 
world and become a powerful conditioning force within it. Homo histrio might be termed the 
theatricalization of the human condition, or, as Lionel Abel puts it, “life seen as already 
theatricalised.”5 And while homo histrio is not necessarily Shakespeare’s final word on humanity 
(though he certainly employs the notion again in Othello, King Lear, and The Tempest), it 
effectively addresses key issues around which the play’s critique of traditional anthropology 
coheres: rationality, epistemology, temporality, language, identity, and agency.  It is an elegant, 
modest, and flexible definition of the human, one that acknowledges the ineluctable presence of 
irrationality, contingency, illusion, and conditioning in human life. 
As all readers and auditors of Hamlet know, the arrival of the players in Act Two, scene 
two, changes everything, not least the protagonist’s mood.  The cloud of melancholy hanging 
over the prince temporarily lifts, and he springs to life, suddenly enthusiastic, gregarious, and  
purposeful: “there did seem in him a kind of joy/ To hear of it” (3.1.18-9). I wish to suggest that 
the arrival of the players and the extended meditation on theatre which follows are directly 
relevant to Hamlet’s conflicted meditations on human nature. When Hamlet tells his former 
                     
4 I am not using the term as a synonym for  homo ludens – man the player – Johan Huizinga’s 
term which covers a wide range of cultural phenomena and does not pertain to theatricality per 
se. Nor is the term as narrow as Erving Goffman’s “dramaturgical self” developed in The 
Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, (New York: Anchor Books, 1959) or Colin McGinn’s 
“theatrical construction of a self,” an adaption of Goffman’s concept used in Shakespeare’s 
Philosophy: Discovering the Meaning Behind the Plays. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
2006), 10-12. Homo histrio is meant to stand as a comprehensive metaphor for human nature 
parallel to homo rationalis. 
 
5 Lionel Abel, Metadrama: A New View of Dramatic Form (New York: Hill and Wang, 1963),  
60. 
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schoolfellows, “Man delights not me” (2.2.309), Rosencrantz smiles in amusement:  
 Ham. Why did ye laugh then, when I said man delights not me? 
Ros. To think my lord, if you delight not in man, what Lenten entertainment the 
players shall receive from you. We coted them by the way, and hither are they 
coming to offer you service. 
Ham. He that plays the king shall be welcome….  
(2.2.312-8) 
Rosencrantz has a valid point. If Hamlet’s claim is true – that he no longer takes delight in 
humanity per se -- then this must necessarily include the players. It is evident, however, that the 
players, “Even those you [i.e. Hamlet] were wont to take such delight in” (2.2.326), are a striking 
exception to the rule, a continuing source of delight to the Prince despite his disillusionment with 
human beings in general. One might even go out on a limb and argue that, while Hamlet no 
longer finds homo rationalis viable, the actors represent a way of being human which he can 
embrace, an anthropological paradigm which is precisely answerable to the objections he has 
conceived against the classical-humanist model.  
In our own time, when theorists from a variety of fields – e.g. Erving Goffman, Kenneth 
Burke, Gregory Adams, Elizabeth Burns, Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner6 – have appropriated 
and generalized dramatic and theatrical concepts in order to construct theories of the self, social 
                     
6  Burke, Kenneth, A Grammar of Motives, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945); 
Gregory Adams, All the World's a Stage, (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Elizabeth Burns, 
Theatricality: A study of convention in the theatre and in social life (New York: Longman, 
1972); Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Victor 
Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play, (New York: Performing Arts 
Journal Publishing, 1987) .  
7 Quotations are all from Arden Editions of the plays: A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Ed. Harold 
F. Brooks, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1979); Henry V, Ed. T.W. Craik, (London: Methuen 
Drama, 1999); The Tempest, Eds. Virginia Mason Vaughan and Alden T. Vaughan, (London: 
Methuen Drama, 1999); Macbeth, Ed. Kenneth Muir, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1951).   
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behaviour, and cultural practice, it is easy to underestimate the bold originality of Hamlet. To 
offer up the actor as anthropological model was audacious in a strongly antitheatrical milieu in 
which actors and acting were persistently associated with inauthenticity, affectation, deception, 
hypocrisy, unreality, and unnaturalness. Indeed, Shakespeare’s own references to actors often 
have an antitheatrical cast; they are “shadows” (A Midsumer Night’s Dream 5.1.208, 409), 
“ciphers” (Henry V Prol. 17,)  “meaner ministers” (The Tempest 3.3.87) and  “poor player[s]/ 
That strut and fret [their] hour upon the stage,/ And then [are] heard no more” (Macbeth 5.5.24-
6).7 Even in Hamlet, where the acting “quality” is treated with relative dignity, the protagonist 
expresses dehumanizing contempt for popular but inept players, “that neither having th’accent of 
Christians, nor the gait of Christian, pagan, nor man, have so strutted and bellowed that I have 
thought some of Nature’s journeymen had made men, and not made them well, they imitated 
humanity so abominably” (3.2.31-5). This passage simultaneously establishes the figure of the 
actor as a potential “measure of man,” while quieting potential objections to this standard by 
acknowledging the inferiority of particular actors and performances.  
But Shakespeare’s purpose goes well beyond outflanking the enemies of the stage by 
pandering to anti-theatrical biases. Rather, he appropriates and transforms the ancient analogical 
trope of  theatrum mundi – all the world’s a stage. As Anne Barton contends in Shakespeare and 
the Idea of the Play, Shakespeare found in the commonplace of theatrum mundi “a virtually 
inexhaustible means of expression, reflecting the multiple possibilities inherent in the dramatic 
situation itself” and turned this into something “individual and characteristically brilliant.”8 But, 
                     
 
8 Anne Righter (Barton),  Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play (London: Penguin Books, 1962), 
89. Barton argues that Shakespeare’s contemporaries used theatrum mundi persistently to 
represent the theatricality of  English political, social, and religious life, whether the ideological 
use of public spectacle by princes, the sermons of divines dramatizing the splendour and 
transience of human life, or the use of costume and stagecraft in the gulling of dupes (83-4, 113). 
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as Thomas Postlethwait and Tracy Davis argue, Hamlet is not merely a compendium of the 
theatrum mundi heritage, but in fact the inaugural point of a new kind of dramatic self-
consciousness.9 In a period when many European playwrights were exploring the possibilities of 
metadrama, or drama about drama, Hamlet is the metadramatic work par excellence, utilizing all 
of the varieties of overt metadrama: plays-within-plays, ceremonies within plays, role-playing 
within roles, literary/real life references, self-reference, and the theme of drama and perception.10 
As Alvin B. Kernan notes, Shakespeare depicts all life at Elsinore as acting and playing; virtually 
every scene (e.g. Hamlet’s first meeting with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Ophelia’s pretense 
of prayer in the “nunnery scene”) is a latent or submerged play-within-the-play.11 In Hamlet, 
Shakespeare’s self-reflexive meditation on the art of theatre  suspends the dramatic illusion and 
in so doing sets up a conceptual mirror which illuminates the conventional, illusory, and 
theatrical nature of everyday life. Further, I would argue, the play is designed to produce in its 
auditors metadramatic consciousness, a multi-level awareness in which one simultaneously 
‘believes’ in the dramatic illusion, perceives the play as theatrical artifice, and experiences self-
conscious awareness of one’s own awareness (i.e. becoming one’s own audience, as it were). 
This metadramatic experience, writes Richard Hornby, is characterized by “unease, a dislocation 
of perception,”12 and it is uncannily analogous with the shift of consciousness we observe in the 
protagonist, who comes to perceive his own reality metadramatically. As James Calderwood 
argues, Shakespeare “wants our disillusionment to mirror Hamlet’s….For Hamlet the Ghost’s 
                     
9 Thomas Postlethwait and Tracy C. Davis, “Theatricality: An Introduction,” in Theatricality, 
Ed. Tracy C. Davis and Thomas Postlethwait, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
11, 15. 
10 Richard Hornby,  Drama, Metadrama, and Perception, (Lewisburg: Bucknell University 
Press, 1986), 31-2. 
11 Alvin Kernan, The Playwright as Magician: Shakespeare’s Image of the Poet in the English 
Public Theater, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 101-3. 
12 Hornby,  Metadrama, 32. 
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story dissolves, annuls, or in the fashionable term deconstructs his schoolboy conceptions of a 
world governed by honor, love, and truth. ….So Hamlet discovers behind the arras of his 
youthful assumptions the fraudulence of the world, and suffers for his knowledge.”13Yet, 
Calderwood goes on to argue, though we participate in Hamlet’s disillusionment, we also move 
with him toward “a more embracing conception of the human condition, one that neither 
endorses nor denies either innocence or disillusion but acknowledges both.”14  In this paper, I 
would like to demonstrate how this double consciousness coheres in the metadramatic figure of 
homo histrio, drawing particular attention to its recuperative and constructive function in Hamlet.  
Homo Rationalis and its Discontents 
  To appreciate Hamlet’s reconception of  human nature, we begin with the classical-
humanist model I have called homo rationalis – the human being as a rational or thinking animal 
– as memorably delineated by Pico della Mirandola in the Oration on the Dignity of Man. Pico 
begins with the striking assertion that human beings were created in indeterminate form at the 
midpoint of creation and endowed by the Creator with the capacity for rational self-fashioning: 
“In conformity with thy free judgment, in whose hands I have placed thee, thou art confined by 
no bounds; and thou wilt fix limits of nature for thyself...Thou, like a judge appointed for being 
honourable, art the molder and maker of thyself.”15 According to Pico, the fact that “we may be 
what we will to be” (7) confers on humans godlike dignity and unlimited potential. Through the 
exercise of  reason – which he defines as that “ by which the soul measures, judges, and 
examines everything” (15)  – human beings move upward in the chain of being toward union 
                     
13 James Calderwood, To Be and Not to Be: Negation and Metadrama in Hamlet, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983), 169-70. 
14 Calderwood, Negation, 173. 
15 Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man, Trans. Charles Glenn Wallis, (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1998), 4-5. All subsequent quotations from the Oration are 
from this edition 
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with the divine, the realm of authentic being (5). For Pico, the apex of human development is the 
philosopher, the type of sovereign human selfhood who transcends temporal and somatic 
finitude, attaining a lofty autonomy through pure rationality:16 “If you come upon a pure 
contemplator, ignorant of the body, banished to the innermost part of the mind, he is not an 
earthly, not a heavenly animal; he more superbly is a divinity clothed with human flesh” (6). 
Reason for Pico is the defining human trait and the ruling faculty in a divinely ordered inner 
hierarchy comprising understanding, imagination, memory, will, sense, passion, and appetite. 
Certainly, this model allows for the possibility of internal conflict between the higher and lower 
faculties, though it is a conflict in which reason is assured the victory as it brings the passions 
into harmonious accord (10-1).17 Pico’s affirmation of human reason and dignity is  accompanied 
by a confidence in language or discourse, “the speaking or reasoning art” by which humans 
move up the ladder of being (10) and communicate truth from mind to mind.18  Yet the sovereign 
                     
16 In the Heptaplus, Pico urges the reader, “let us enter into our very selves, into the inner 
chambers of the soul…so that we may successfully recognize in ourselves not only all the worlds 
but also our Father and our home” (Pico della Mirandola, Heptaplus, trans. Douglas Carmichael, 
in On the Dignity of Man, [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1998] ,  118). 
17 This is Pico’s memorable depiction of inner conflict: “there is multiple discord in us, and we 
have severe, intestine, and more than civil wars at home: if we are unwilling to have these wars, 
if we will strive for that peace which so lifts us up to the heights that we are made to stand 
among the exalted of the Lord, moral philosophy alone will still those wars in us, will bring calm 
successfully. First, if our man will seek a truce with the enemy, he will subdue the uncurbed 
forays of the multiple brute, the quarrellings of the lion, and the feelings of wrath. Then if we 
take the right counsel, and desire for ourselves the security of everlasting peace, it will come and 
will fulfil our prayers liberally. The slaying of both beasts, like stuck sows, will establish most 
solemnly a most holy treaty between the flesh and the spirit. Dialectic will calm the turmoils of a 
reason shoved about between the fistfights of oratory and the deceits of the syllogism” (Dignity, 
10-1). 
18 Both the rhetorical form and content of the Oration imply confidence in the capacity of 
language to convey truth, especially the adequacy of written texts: “they could not remain long in 
memory without the mediation of writings” (Dignity, 31).We see this confidence as well in 
Pico’s bold assertion that he has harmonized Christian theology with the wisdom of the 
kabbalistic writings and other occult traditions by drawing out their secret meaning, and brought 
them to light through his own perspicuous use of language (Dignity, 33). 
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self, as Pico conceives it, is resolutely individualistic, even anti-social, little concerned with the 
communal aspect of communication. Content with the pleasures of disinterested solitary 
contemplation, he has no abiding need of other human beings and disdains earthly things, 
including the vagaries of economic life and the good opinion of others. Of his own pursuit of the 
contemplative ideal, Pico says, 
I have never philosophized for any reason other than for the sake of 
philosophizing…I have neither hoped nor sought from my studies…any other 
gain or profit than cultivation of soul and knowledge of truth….I have always 
been so desirous of this truth, and so much in love with it that, abandoning all care 
of public and private affairs, I gave my whole self over to the leisure of 
contemplating, from which no disparaging of the envious, no curses from the 
enemies of wisdom, have been able so far or will be able later  to frighten me 
away. Philosophy herself has taught me to weigh things rather by my own 
conscience than by the judgments of others, and to consider not so much whether 
I should be badly spoken of as whether I myself should say or do anything bad.           
(18) 
Endowed with the capacity for cognitive certainty and a free and effective will, homo rationalis 
can practice moral agency without hindrance from external and internal determinative forces 
(e.g. fate, fortune, heredity, etc.),  making man “the animal that is most happy, and is therefore 
worthy of all wonder” (3).  
 In contrast, Hamlet conveys an ambivalent view of homo rationalis. There is undoubtedly 
a powerful strain of Piconian humanism in the play. “Godlike reason” (4.4.38), for example, is 
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repeatedly affirmed as the ultimate arbiter in human affairs and actions.19 Indeed reason is 
identified as  the sine qua non of humanity per se: “O God, a beast that wants discourse of 
reason/ Would have mourned longer”  (1.2.150-1); “Divided from herself and her fair judgment,/ 
Without the which we are pictures, or mere beasts” (4.5.85-6). Like Pico, Hamlet identifies 
authentic being with rational inwardness and disdains corporeal life as mere appearance or 
seeming: 
  Seems, madam? Nay, it is. I know not ‘seems.’ 
  ‘Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,  
Nor customary suits of solemn black, 
Nor windy suspiration of forc’d breath, 
No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,  
Nor the dejected haviour of the visage, 
Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief, 
That can denote me truly. These indeed seem, 
For they are actions that a man might play; 
But I have that within which passes show, 
These but the trappings and suits of woe.  
(1.2.76-86) 
Hamlet thinks of the body  as a mere “machine”  (2.2.124), a “quintessence of dust” (2.2.317), 
and a “mortal coil” to be shuffled off (3.1.67), and he longs to transcend the flesh through death: 
“O that this too too sullied flesh would melt,/ Thaw and resolve itself into a dew,/ Or that the 
                     
19 For example,  Claudius says, “You cannot speak of reason to the Dane/ And lose your voice” 
(1.2.44-45) and “A fault against the dead, a fault to nature,/ To reason most absurd” (1.2.102-
103). 
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Everlasting had not fix’d / His canon ‘gainst self-slaughter” (1.2.129-32).20 The flesh, for Hamlet 
is contemptibly vulnerable and corruptible, heir to a “thousand natural shocks” (3.1.62) and 
subject to the humiliation of decomposition (4.3.16-31; 5.1.158-205). He could therefore be 
contented  to “be bounded in a nutshell and count [himself] the king of infinite space” (2.2.254-
5), rather than encased in flesh.  
Temporal life, the play suggests, is a prolonged assault on human dignity. In the play’s 
most famous soliloquy, the principal criterion for being or non-being is the consciousness of 
one’s own human worth, and the options are weighed according to what is “nobler in the mind” 
(3.1.57). Death relieves one, not of insupportable suffering or metaphysical uncertainty, but of 
the burden of being undervalued or insulted by one’s inferiors: “For who would bear the whips 
and scorns of time,/ Th’ oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s contumely,/ The pangs of dispriz’d 
love, the law’s delay,’/ The insolence of office, and the spurns/ That patient merit of th’ 
unworthy takes….” (3.1.70-4). Pico argues in the Heptaplus that spiritual impulses toward fame, 
anger, and revenge are laudable and appropriate to a proper human self-valuation, for “everyone 
ought to preserve his dignity and not refuse honors obtained in honest ways.”21 Hamlet too is 
acutely sensitive to the loss of honour, such as his countrymen being branded drunkards  because 
of the custom of the “heavy-headed revel” (1.4.17-22). He is also profoundly disturbed by the 
scandalous inability of his contemporaries to distinguish between greatness and infamy, 
substance and shadow, most pointedly in the substitution of Claudius, “a king of shreds and 
patches” (3.4.103) for the “gracious figure” (3.4.104-5) of his father.22 
As is the case with Pico, Hamlet’s humanistic ideal is the philosopher, the individual 
                     
20 The textual crux in Hamlet’s first soliloquy is variously rendered by editors as “sallied,” 
“sullied,” and “solid,” but whether Hamlet’s flesh is too tainted or too solid, he wishes for it to 
undergo a kind of sublimation (1.2.129-30). 
21 Pico, Heptaplus, 124. 
22 See also 2.2.263-4 and 3.2.129-30. 
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whose intellectual self-discipline makes him invulnerable to both external contingencies and 
internal perturbation. He perceives such an ideal in Horatio, who is able to subordinate the 
appetitive demands of “blood” to rational judgment and is thus loftily indifferent to the arbitrary 
fluctuations of Fortune:  
Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice 
And could of men distinguish her election, 
Sh’ath sealed thee for herself; for thou hast been 
As one in suff'ring all that suffers nothing, 
A man that Fortune's buffets and rewards 
Hast ta'en with equal thanks; and blest are those 
Whose blood and judgment are so well commeddled 
That they are not a pipe for Fortune's finger 
To sound what stop she please. Give me that man  
That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him 
In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart, 
As I do thee.  
(3.2.65-76 ) 
Hamlet admires Horatio’s neo-stoic constancy, his dignified self-control under pressure. From 
the Prince’s standpoint, Horatio’s antithesis is Gertrude whose “o’erhasty marriage” is a 
shameful surrender of reason to the lower faculties: “You cannot call it love; for at your age/ The 
heyday in the blood is tame, it’s humble,/ And waits upon the judgment, and what judgment/ 
Would step from this to this?” (3.4.68-71).  
Yet, even as it articulates this classical-humanist anthropology, the play reveals it to be 
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overstated and untenable. Much of the play’s dramatic power derives from the protagonist’s 
painful discovery that homo rationalis represents an impossibly idealistic account of both the 
human condition and his own disordered subjectivity. As Hamlet’s paean to Horatio makes clear, 
instances of homo rationalis in the Piconian mold are exceedingly rare, yet, if that is true, does 
the classical-humanist definition of humanity hold? Throughout the course of the play, various 
characters, overwhelmed by passion, appetite, or trauma, suffer an impairment of reason, yet it is 
not at all clear that this abrogates their humanity. Indeed, Gertrude and Claudius are perhaps 
most fully and characteristically human in their irrational, akratic persistence in incestuous 
cohabitation, while Ophelia’s mad discourse is “pregnant” with signification, insight, and 
humanity, “a happiness,” notes Polonius earlier in the play, “that often madness hits on, which 
reason and sanity could not so prosperously be delivered of” (2.2.209-11).   
Typically, the play’s generalizations about “noble and sovereign reason” (3.1.159) are 
embedded in self-contradictory enthymemes and situational ironies that amount to an inadvertant 
refutation of homo rationalis: 
What is a man, 
If his chief good and market of his time  
Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more. 
Sure he that made us with such large discourse, 
Looking before and after, gave us not 
That capability and godlike reason 
To fust in us unused. Now whether it be 
Bestial oblivion, or some craven scruple 
Of thinking too precisely on th' event - 
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A thought which quarter'd hath but one part wisdom  
And ever three parts coward -- I do not know 
Why yet I live to say, "This thing's to do,"  
Sith I have cause, and will, and strength, and means  
To do't.  
(4.4.33-46) 
This soliloquy is occasioned by the spectacle of the Norwegian Prince Fortinbras and his army 
crossing into Poland in order “to gain a little patch of ground/ That hath in it no profit  but the 
name” (4.4.18-9), and this context ironically demonstrates the inadequacy of homo rationalis. 
Hamlet begins by asserting with certainty that the God-given discourse of reason is an objective 
standard by which to judge human actions. According to this standard, his own relative inactivity 
– sleeping and feeding when he ought to be killing Claudius – constitutes a sub-human 
abandonment of rationality. But this judgment is only superficially plausible, for Hamlet, as he 
goes on to admit, does not really understand the source of his own reticence to seek revenge. 
While it could be attributed to thinking too little (“Bestial oblivion”), it could just as plausibly be 
the result of thinking too much, which in turn could be his mind’s attempt to rationalize its own 
cowardice.23 Apparently, rational consideration of the moral consequences of action paralyzes 
the capacity to act.  Seizing on this explanation, Hamlet proceeds to compare himself 
unfavourably with Fortinbras, “Whose spirit, with divine ambition puff’d,/ Makes mouths at the 
invisible event,/ Exposing what is mortal and unsure/ To all that fortune, death, and danger dare,/ 
Even for an eggshell” (4.4.49-53). In other words, Hamlet reverses his position during the course 
                     
23 The phrase “craven scruple” recalls the play’s most famous soliloquy where Hamlet contends 
that “conscience does make cowards of us all” and “the native hue of resolution/ Is sicklied o’er 
with the pale cast of thought” (3.1.83-85). In this astonishingly pessimistic speech, suicide is 
offered as a rational response to suffering. 
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of the speech. In the end, Fortinbras is to be praised for his irrationality, for how else can one 
characterize the slaughter of twenty-thousand men in the  reckless pursuit of military honour, 
which Hamlet calls a  mere “eggshell” and “straw” (4.4.55), “a fantasy and trick of fame” 
(4.4.61)?   
What is the implied status of homo rationalis when Hamlet, arguably literature’s most 
intelligent and introspective character, provides such a contradictory account of human reason 
and fails so miserably to perceive the implications of his own argument? Montaigne, in his 
“Apology for Raymond Sebond,” grounds his critique of human nature on  “man in his highest 
estate…that small number of excellent and select men who, having been endowed with fine and 
particular natural ability, have further strengthened it by care, by study, and by art, and have 
raised it to the highest pitch of wisdom that it can attain” (371).24 He nevertheless concludes that 
“there are few souls so orderly, so strong and wellborn, that they can be trusted with their own 
guidance” (420). Hamlet, the archetypal Renaissance man, possessing the “courtier’s, soldier’s, 
scholar’s, eye, tongue, sword” (3.1.153) seems a likely exception, but his intellectual potency – 
his tendency, for example,  to think “too precisely on th’event” – proves not only a hindrance to 
the straightforward achievement of revenge, but renders his own descent into irrationality more 
threatening, as Claudius notes: “There’s something in his soul/ O’er which his melancholy sits 
on brood,/ And I do doubt the hatch and the disclose/ Will be some danger…../ …. / Madness in 
great ones much not unwatch’d go” (3.1.166-9, 190). The mind, says Montaigne, is “a dangerous 
blade, even to its possessor” (420), “an erratic, dangerous, and heedless tool,” particularly for 
“those who have some rare excellence beyond the others, and some extraordinary quickness” 
(419). The opinions and conduct of the intellectually gifted often burst the bounds of moderation, 
                     
24 Michel de Montaigne, “Apology for Raymond Sebond,” trans. Donald M. Frame, in The 
Complete Essays of Montaigne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957),  371. All subsequent 
quotations from Montaigne come from this edition. 
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so that “It is a miracle if you find a sedate and sociable one” (419).  Moreover, when persons of 
quick, keen, agile, and subtle mind go insane, they are given to “the greatest and wildest 
manias,” for “[w]ho does not know how imperceptibly near is madness to the lusty flights of a 
free mind and the effects of supreme and extraordinary virtue?” (363).  
Reason  is defined by Montaigne as “that semblance of intellect that each man fabricates 
in himself” and “an instrument of lead and of wax, stretchable, pliable, and adaptable to all 
biases and all measures” (425). As such, it produces no certain or indisputable knowledge (414), 
and training in philosophy provides negligible help in overcoming fundamental human 
ignorance: “For every philosopher is ignorant of what his neighbor is doing, yes, and of what he 
himself is doing, and does not know what they both are, whether beasts or men” (402). If 
anything, humanist confidence in dialectic is a trap. As Montaigne contends, “Reason does 
nothing but go astray in everything, and especially when it meddles with divine things” (386). 
For Montaigne, Piconian speculation about the sovereign self’s capacity for rational self-
formation and divinization would constitute egregious examples of presumption, “our natural 
and original malady” (330). He argues instead that man, far from being a noble, self-determining 
being placed in the indeterminate middle of creation, is a miserable and puny creature, lodged in 
“the mire and dung of the world” (330), yet so ridiculously vain to imagine himself God’s equal, 
the “master and emperor of the universe, the least part of which it is not in his power to know, 
much less to command” (328-9, 331). Montaigne bases this pessimistic view not merely on 
general observation but close scrutiny of himself: “I would hardly dare tell of the vanity and 
weakness that I find in myself” (425).  
     While Hamlet praises reason, it also reveals its vulnerability to corruption and its limited 
functionality. We see, for example, the cheapening of reason in Polonius whose brain “[hunts] 
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the trail of policy” (2.2.47) rather than truth. In the case of Gertrude, “reason panders will” 
(3.4.88), feverishly manufacturing rationalizations for sin. But reason may fail quite apart from 
human intention. The “o’ergrowth of some complexion,” for example, may break down “the 
pales and forts of reason” (1.4.27-8), or fear may deprive one of the “sovereignty of reason” 
(1.4.73). Hamlet -- perhaps disingenuously, perhaps not -- admits his own rational dysfunction: 
“I cannot reason” (2.2.265); “My wit’s diseased” (3.2.313). While not repudiating philosophy, 
the play emphasizes its limitations: “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,/ That 
are dreamt of in your philosophy” (1.5.174-5); “there is something in this more than natural, if 
philosophy could find it out” (2.2.363-4). And, like Montaigne’s “Apology,” Hamlet voices 
radical epistemological skepticism, doubt, and uncertainty that call reason’s provenance into 
question: “Doubt truth to be a liar” (2.2.117); “there’s nothing either good or bad but thinking 
makes it so” (2.2.249-50); “I’ll have grounds/ More relative than this” (2.2.599-600), “Since no 
man, of aught he leaves, knows aught, what is’t to leave betimes” (5.2.218-20).  
Doubts about reason lead almost inevitably to doubts about the composition and stability 
of the self. Even though the authorial voice in Montaigne’s essays is powerfully individual, one 
of his most persistent themes is the inconsistency and variability of the self: “My footing is so 
unsteady, and so insecure, I find it so vacillating and ready to slip, and my sight is so unreliable, 
that on an empty stomach I feel myself another man than after a meal….Now I am ready to do 
anything, now to do nothing; what is a pleasure to me at this moment will some time be a 
trouble. Either the melancholic humor grips me, or the choleric; and at this moment sadness 
predominates in me by its own private authority, at that moment good cheer” (425). While 
Montaigne objects to the philosophers’ division of the soul into many parts, making man into an 
imaginary republic (401), he fully acknowledges the chaotic inner diversity which defeats all 
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anthropological taxonomies: “we have as our share inconstancy, irresolution, uncertainty, grief, 
superstition, worry over things to come even after our life, ambition, avarice, jealousy, envy, 
unruly, frantic, curiosity. Indeed we have strangely overpaid for this fine reason that we glory in, 
and this capacity to judge and know, if we have bought it at the price of this infinite number of 
passions to which we are incessantly a prey” (358). Hamlet  likewise questions the existence of 
the authentic, unitary self. Hamlet may speak of his inner integrity and coherence – “I have that 
within which passeth show” (1.2.85) – and Polonius may counsel, “to thine own self be true” 
(1.3.79), but often the play presents that self as radically conflicted, unstable, and fractured. In 
the extreme condition of madness, complete dissociation of the self may occur: “Was’t Hamlet 
wrong’d Laertes? Never Hamlet./ If Hamlet from himself be ta’en away,/ And when he’s not 
himself does wrong Laertes,/ Then Hamlet does it not, Hamlet denies it” (5.2.229-32). But even 
among the sane, the self is hardly an ordered hierarchy of faculties; it seems rather a volatile 
mixture of competing elements typically colluding to unseat or compromise reason. 25 Even 
though he is considered “The glass of fashion and the mould of form,/ The observ’d of all 
observers” (3.1.155-6),  Hamlet’s own discourse of reason is frequently disrupted by the pangs 
of grief, disgust, rage, fear, dread, self-loathing, and envy, particularly in the soliloquies whose 
mangled syntax signifies, not only the inherently discontinuous and disordered nature of his 
thought, but his sense of self-alienation,26 which, like Montaigne, he recognizes through close 
self-examination:  “I am myself indifferent honest, but yet I could accuse me of such things that 
it were better my mother had not borne me: I am very proud, revengeful, ambitious, with more 
offenses at my beck than I have thoughts to put them in, imagination to give shape, or time to act 
                     
25 Note the fractured sense of self in the following passages : (1.2.92-104) (3.3.38-41) (3.4.68-76, 
85-8).  
26 See, for example,  1.2.129-59 and  2.2.543-88. 
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them in. What should such fellows as I do crawling between earth and heaven? We are arrant 
knaves, believe none of us” (3.1.123-30). As strenuously as Calvin, the play affirms the doctrine 
of universal depravity: “A savageness in unreclaimed blood,/ Of general assault” (2.1.34-5); 
“Use every man after his desert, and who shall scape whipping?” (2.2.524-5); “Nymph, in thy 
orisons/ Be all my sins remember’d” (3.1.89-90).  The moral world, like the physical, is radically 
entropic: youth and innocence are susceptible to “calumnious strokes,” “canker,” and 
“contagious blastments” (1.3.38, 39, 42), while a single defect can corrupt the possessor of 
virtues which are otherwise “pure as grace,/ As infinite as man may undergo” (1.4.33-4). Ascent 
to the angelic proves more difficult than descent to the venial, bestial, and demonic. It is not even 
a fair fight;  while the power of beauty transforms honesty (i.e. chastity)  into a bawd (3.1.111-2), 
“virtue cannot so inoculate our old stock but we shall relish of it” (3.1.117-8).   
Humanity’s depraved, fallen condition and unstable sense of identity, in both Montaigne 
and Shakespeare, manifest themselves in the problem of language. Montaigne argues that, owing 
to the weaknesses and defects in speech, “Most of the occasions for the troubles of the world are 
grammatical” (392), and that “the world is filled and soaked with twaddle and lies”  (403). So 
too  Hamlet also calls into question the reliability of language as a vehicle for rational discourse 
and truth, exposing the various ways that language is abused by those who use it, and how 
language betrays them in turn. Words in Hamlet are either too plentiful  (“More matter with less 
art” [2.2.95]) or too scarce, as characters lapse into enforced or voluntary silence: “But break my 
heart, for I must hold my tongue” (1.2.159).27  Calumny (1.3.38; 3.1.136-8) and mendacity 
(2.2.178-9; 3.2.348) are ubiquitous, and “To be honest, as this world goes, is to be one man 
picked out of ten thousand” (2.2.178-9). There are persistent contradictions between words and 
                     
27 See as well 1.3.59-60, 1.5.13-4 , 1.5.144, 152, 159, 185-86, 3.4.198-200. 
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intentions (“Words without thoughts”[3.3.98]), and between words and actions (““my deed to 
my most painted word” [3.1.53]). Language is the instrument of deception par excellence. 
Polonius, for example, describes Hamlet’s vows of love as “mere implorators of unholy suits,/ 
Breathing like sanctified and pious bawds,/ The better to beguile” (1.3.129-31). Language is a 
devalued currency, of little worth without the collateral of deeds. Laertes, for example, counsels 
Ophelia to believe Hamlet only insofar as “his particular act and place/ May give his saying 
deed” (1.3.26-7), while Claudius insists that Laertes, in turn, “show [himself his] father's son in 
deed/ More than in words” (4.7.124-5). Certainly there are obvious abusers of language like 
Polonius with his long-winded tribute to brevity (2.2.86-92) and Osric with his “golden words” 
(5.2.129).  But the inadequacy does not wholly lie in the speakers themselves; the inherent 
fallenness of language as an instrument to convey human inwardness is also implied. Hamlet, for 
instance, finds it demeaning that he “Must like a whore unpack [his] heart with words” (2.2.581), 
for, though silence is unendurable,  words inevitably falsify what he feels. Overall, the play 
exposes the enormous potential for misunderstanding that results from human reliance on 
language. 
 The anti-humanist critique in Hamlet also emphasizes the ineluctable effects of 
temporality on the human condition. It is no surprise, argues Montaigne, that certainty of 
judgment is impossible, since both “the judging and the judged [are] in continual change and 
motion” (455). The perceiving human subject can have “no communication with being” because 
all things, including the would-be knower, are “coming into being and not yet fully existent” 
(455). Similarly, in Hamlet human beings are depicted as “fools of nature” (1.4.54), caught in an 
unstable temporal flux and subject to unpredictable change: “Lord, we know what we are, but 
know not what we may be” (4.5.43-4). Laertes, for example, tells Ophelia to consider Hamlet’s 
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professions of love as merely “Forward, not permanent, sweet, not lasting,/ The perfume and 
suppliance of a minute” (1.3.8-9) because “young” Hamlet is still in a process of becoming: “as 
this temple waxes,/ The inward service of the mind and soul/ Grows wide withal” (1.3.12-4). 
While the characters ideally wish to master time – “Take thy fair hour, Laertes, time be thine,/ 
And thy best graces spend it at thy will” (1.2.62-3) – they find this extraordinarily difficult, and 
the overall impression is that of temporal dislocation: “The time is out of joint” (1.5.196). The 
great determinative fact is the brevity of human existence: “a man’s life [is] no more than to say 
‘one’” (5.2.74). From this standpoint, time is in desperately short supply: “Not shriving-time 
allow’d” (5.2.46); “Had I but time” (5.2.341).  Yet, from another standpoint, time may seem 
intolerably long, especially when “the whips and scorns of time” (3.1.70) inflict protracted 
suffering.  Human beings typically misspend and waste time rather than redeem it; Hamlet, for 
example, accuses himself of being “lapsed in time and passion” (3.4.108). Some actions, like the 
killing of Polonius, fail for being “untimely” (4.1.40) or premature, while others, like the killing 
of Claudius, “come tardy off” (3.2.25). Time-pleasers, like Osric, strive to achieve modishness 
but only manage to get “the tune of the time” (5.2.186-7). Time frustrates human desires and 
designs, irrespective of reason or will. Claudius, in counselling Laertes to revenge, brings the 
problem of temporality into sharp focus: 
Not that I think you did not love your father, 
But that I know love is begun by time, 
And that I see, in passages of proof, 
Time qualifies the spark and fire of it. 
There lives within the very flame of love 
A kind of wick or snuff that will abate it, 
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And nothing is at a like goodness still, 
For goodness, growing to a plurisy, 
Dies in his own too much. That we would do, 
We should do when we would; for this `would' changes, 
And hath abatements and delays as many 
As there are tongues, are hands, are accidents, 
And then this `should' is like a spendthrift's sigh,,  
That hurts by easing.  
(4.7.110-23 ) 
As Claudius points out, everything born in time changes and ceases to be; even the strongest 
passions and best intentions abate in the face of temporal contingencies. As the Player King tells 
the Player Queen, “what we do determine oft we break,” either because the original motivating 
passion lapses or because circumstances change arbitrarily (3.2.192-219).  
Indeed, with respect to the alleged agency of the sovereign self, Hamlet depicts human 
beings as mere “player” kings and queens, whose wills are tragically limited: “Our wills and 
fates do so contrary run/ That our devices still are overthrown:/ Our thoughts are ours, their ends 
none of our own” (3.2.206-8). Hamlet himself is emblematic of the human condition in that his 
“will is not his own. For he himself is subject to his birth” (1.3.17-8), and “nature cannot choose 
his origin” (1.4.26). If Pico instantiates the image of self-fashioned, self-determined human 
beings ascending to divinization through the exercise of the intellect, Hamlet, like Montaigne’s 
“Apology,” seems calculated “to crush and trample underfoot human arrogance and pride; to 
make them feel the inanity, the vanity and nothingness, of man; to wrest from their hands the 
puny weapons of their reason; to make them bow their heads and bite the ground beneath the 
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authority and reverence of divine majesty.”28  
Enter Homo Histrio 
How then does the notion of homo histrio represent a viable alternative to homo 
rationalis, mediating between Piconian ideals and Montaignean critique. First, homo histrio 
implies modest claims about human capabilities and potential rather than hyperbolic ones. The 
actor in Shakespeare’s time was often an undignified figure of folly. Alluding to the theatrical 
profession, the speaker in Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 110” laments that he has “gone here and there,/ 
And made [himself] a motley to the view” (1-2),29 i.e. a public fool. In the Elizabethan context, a 
player (presuming he was not an unlicensed “rogue” or “vagabond”) would possess the official 
status of a servant in a noble house, a subordinate “coming to offer...service” (2.2.317). Little 
would be expected from actors besides “abridgement” (2.2.416) or entertaining diversion, even 
from “the best actors in the world” (2.2.392), as Polonius calls the “tragedians of the city” 
(2.2.327). Yet homo histrio is not simply the antithesis of Pico’s sovereign self; rather, the actor 
exposes the truth that sovereignty itself is merely a role – “He that plays the king shall be 
welcome” (2.2.318) – not part of the human essence. Theatrical imitation per se tends to 
undermine human pretensions to power, dignity, and freedom, and to level social hierarchies; 
indeed, the more skilful the imitation, the more we recognize the artificial, ‘scripted,’ and 
performative nature of social and political life, and metadrama – which presses the analogy 
between theatrical and social roles -- intensifies this effect. As we watch Claudius watching the 
performance of the Player-King, for example, we cannot help but reflect that Claudius himself is 
merely playing the role of king, and we may judge his “seeming” (3.2.87) as we would that of an 
actor. Indeed, the mere presence of the actors at Elsinore not only makes visible the staginess of 
                     
28 Montaigne, “Apology,” 327. 
29 Shakespeare’s Sonnets, Ed. Katherine Duncan-Jones, (London: The Arden Shakespeare, 
2007). 
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the conventions by which Danish society coheres, but simultaneously disrupts or suspends these 
codes, as suggested by Hamlet’s half-hearted apology to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern: “Th’ 
appurtenance of welcome is fashion and ceremony. Let me comply with you in this garb – lest 
my extent to the players, which I tell you must show fairly outwards, should more appear like 
entertainment than yours” (2.2.367-71). “With much forcing if his disposition” (3.1.12) and “in 
the beaten way of friendship” (2.2.269-70), Hamlet complies with the ceremonial forms 
prescribed by the code of courtesy yet in doing so reveals their empty conventionality. One 
important function of the courtesy code is to reinforce social hierarchies, in this instance to mark 
the distinction between the common players and Hamlet’s schoolfellows. Yet these distinctions 
are not observed; Hamlet insists that  Polonius entertain the players as social equals: “Use them 
after your own honour and dignity: the less they deserve, the more merit is in your bounty” (525-
7).  
  Homo histrio, unlike homo rationalis, does not claim certitude of knowledge or 
judgment. In the theatrical paradigm, the threshold of human knowledge is narrowly 
circumscribed. Erving Goffman, in his “dramaturgical” account of self and society, approaches 
social interaction as a realm of performance in which individuals play social roles, act out 
“routines” – pre-established patterns of action – and influence others through various forms of 
concealment and “stage management.”30 In the interpersonal realm, he argues, we can ascertain 
the inner reality of other people – their attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and motives – only indirectly, 
through inferences based on their avowals and involuntary expressive behaviour.31 We see a  
similar perspective operative in Hamlet, where the Prince plots with Horatio to scrutinize 
Claudius’s looks during “The Murder of Gonzago”: 
                     
30 Goffman, Presentation, 6-16. 
31 Goffman, Presentation, 2-4. 
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I prithee, when thou seest that act afoot, 
Even with the very comment of thy soul 
Observe my uncle. If his occulted guilt 
Do not unkennel in one speech, 
It is a damned ghost that we have seen,  
And my imaginations are as foul 
As Vulcan’s stithy. Give him heedful note; 
For I mine eyes will rivet to his face, 
And after we will both our judgments join 
In censure of his seeming.  
(3.2.78-87) 
Claudius is an audience member, but his reaction to the play is to be assessed as “seeming” or 
performance, and, like all theatrical performances, it is ambiguous and open to interpretation. 
Hamlet not only doubts the ghost’s word and his own imaginations, but sufficiently doubts his 
own power of observation to require confirmation from Horatio. Given the ambiguous and 
collective nature of audience response, theatrical judgment is a matter of consensus, not 
individualistic whim: “though it makes the unskilful laugh, [overacting and underacting] cannot 
but make the judicious grieve, the censure of which one must in your allowance o’erweigh a 
whole theatre of others” (3.3.25-8). Indeed, Hamlet, despite his evident knowledge of theatre, 
defers to others when he speaks of those “whose judgments in such matters cried in the top of 
mine” (2.2.434-5). And, as subsequent events illustrate, he has good reason to doubt. When 
Claudius rises and yells, “Give me some light” (3.2.263), for example, he is not unambiguously 
conceding his murderous guilt. The theatrical action which precipitates the interruption of the 
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play is a regicide performed by “Lucianus, nephew to the King” (3.2.239), and it is possible that 
the court interprets Claudius’s response, not as guilt, but as justifiable outrage at being threatened 
by his own nephew: “The King, sir…[is] in his retirement marvellous distempered….with 
choler” (3.2.274-8). Then, in the scene that follows, Hamlet totally misinterprets Claudius’s 
performance, assuming that bent knees signify a repentant heart, when in fact Claudius’s 
“thoughts remain below” (3.3.97). 
The conception of homo histrio also implies a severe circumscription of the individual 
will. Theatrical art is of necessity cooperative and collaborative, not individualistic. It is 
significant that none of the players is identified by name; each is distinguished rather by the 
various theatrical types or ‘lines of business’ in which he specializes: adventurous knight, lover, 
humorous man, lady, etc. (2.2.319-24). One of the reasons Hamlet despises ranting actors who 
“tear a passion to tatters, to very rags, to split the ears of the groundlings” (3.2.10-1) and the 
clowns who pander to the “barren spectators” for cheap laughs (3.2.38-45) is that both are guilty 
of “pitiful ambition” (3.2.44) in a properly collective enterprise; to draw attention to oneself 
when “some necessary question of the play be then to be considered” (3.2.39, 42-3) is selfish and 
self-defeating. Good playwrights and actors, according to Hamlet, cultivate subtlety and self-
restraint, the subordination of individual aspiration and precocity to the effect of the whole: “I 
remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savoury, nor no matter in 
the phrase that might indict the author of affection, but called it an honest method, as wholesome 
as sweet, and by very much more handsome than fine” (2.2.437-41).  This subordination of 
individual to collective good is a healthy corrective to the solipsism of homo rationalis.  
Homo histrio also implies a more plausible relation to temporality than homo rationalis, 
one which fully acknowledges human subjection to contingency and finitude, and in so doing 
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provides an alternative to Pico’s sovereign self. Hamlet emphasizes the players’ vulnerability to 
the vicissitudes of fortune and temporal change in a variety of ways. For example, attention is 
called to the players’ economic dependence. Actors, unlike Pico’s philosopher, cannot afford to 
pursue their art in glorious isolation or to engage in the leisure of disinterested contemplation. 
Playing is their source of income, as we are reminded a number of times: “his Majesty shall have 
tribute on me” (2.2.318-9); “the lover shall not sigh gratis” (2.2.320-1); “if their means are no 
better” (2.2.347-8); “There was for a while no money bid for argument”  (2.2.352).32 Actors are 
likewise painfully subject to changing theatrical tastes and fashions. The city company has been 
forced to travel because the “little eyases that cry out on the top of question, and are most 
tyrannically clapped for’t….are now the fashion” (2.2.337-9); that is, a rival boys’ company, 
specializing in shrill, polemical plays,  have diminished their audience share and profit. This 
threat to the players’ livelihood is not attributable to a decline in quality, for “their endeavour 
keeps in the wonted pace” (2.2.336). Rather the restless, novelty-seeking theatre-going public is 
only interested in personal attacks , where “the poet and the player went to cuffs in the question” 
(2.2.353-4). This is not an anomaly. The nature of the theatrical enterprise renders  players 
subject to the praise and blame, no matter how inane, of amateur critics, “who for the most part 
are capable of nothing but inexplicable dumb-shows and noise” (3.2.11-2). The instability of 
mass audience taste is not merely a professional hazard for actors, but emblematic of the human 
condition. Hamlet compares the fickleness of the theatre audience to the Danish public’s 
changing response to Claudius: “those that would make mouths at him while my father lived 
give twenty, forty, fifty, a hundred ducats apiece for his picture in little” (2.2.360-2).   
Paradoxically, however, homo histrio, whose subjection to temporal contingencies is 
                     
32 Hamlet himself jokes that, should his own fortunes “turn Turk” (i.e. should he lose his 
privileged position as prince), he might seek a “fellowship in a cry of players” (3.2.269-72). 
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obvious, may master time in a way which homo rationalis fails to do. Theatre, of all the arts, is 
the most evanescent, and thus a powerful trope for the temporal finitude of human life, perhaps 
expressed most poignantly in Prospero’s “Our revels now are ended” speech in The Tempest:  
These our actors, 
As I foretold you, were all spirits and 
Are melted into air, into thin air;  
And – like the baseless fabric of this vision – 
The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve, 
And like this insubstantial pageant faded, 
Lead not a rack behind. We are such stuff 
As dreams are made on, and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep.  
(4.1.148-58) 
As Prospero indicates, the evanescence of the theatrical illusion is a mirror of the human 
condition. Yet this very quality, as Hamlet observes, makes the actor the authoritative interpreter 
of the present: “Do you hear, let them be well used, for they are the abstract and brief chronicles 
of the time. After your death you were better have a bad epitaph than their ill report while you 
live” (2.2.519-22). The purpose of playing, he asserts, is “to hold as ‘twere the mirror up to 
nature; to show virtue her feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time 
his form and pressure” (3.2.22-4).  In both its form and content, drama bears faithful witness to 
the poignant brevity of human lives. 
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Homo histrio may likewise provide an imaginative solution to the problem of language. 
Hamlet implies that theatrical representation, as both text and performance, is a use of language 
better adapted to the real world than dialectic. “In the corrupted currents of this world” (3.4.57), 
as Hamlet depicts it, direct, earnest, sincere communication is not possible, except in rare 
circumstances. The truth, as Polonius’s metaphors indicate, is virtually always concealed and can 
only be accessed by means of stratagem and subterfuge: “Your bait of falsehood take this carp of 
truth,/ And thus do we of wisdom and of reach,/ With windlasses and with assays of bias,/ By 
indirections find directions out…” (2.1.62-5). Working on the Montaignean premise that 
language is fallen, the protagonist seeks adaptative strategies rather than longing nostalgically for 
linguistic purity. Like Polonius, he adopts various “fetch[es] of warrant” (2.1.39), most 
obviously his “antic disposition” (1.5.180).33 The most important of these tactics of indirection is 
theatrical representation: 
I have heard that guilty creatures sitting at a play, 
Have by the very cunning of the scene 
Been struck so to the soul that presently 
They have proclaimed their malefactions; 
For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak 
With most miraculous organ. I'll have these players 
Play something like the murder of my father 
Before mine uncle. I'll observe his looks. 
I'll tent him to the quick. If `a do blench 
 
                     
33 He even takes sardonic pleasure in the “sport” of outwitting and undermining his enemies: “O, 
`tis most sweet/ When in one line two crafts directly meet” (3.4.210-1). 
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I know my course.  
(2.2.601-10) 
Here, Hamlet attributes the efficacy of dramatic language, specifically its ability to penetrate the 
human conscience, to “the very cunning of the scene” (2.2.586), that is, its self-effacing 
artfulness. Another virtue of effective dramatic language is “modesty” or restraint; Hamlet 
praises an unnamed but exemplary play as “well digested in the scenes, set down with as much 
modesty as cunning” (2.2.435-7) and instructs the players, “o’erstep not the modesty of nature” 
(3.2.19). Dramatic language, as he conceives it, is inherently disingenuous, hiding its deadly 
seriousness and its learning behind the pretense of inconsequentiality: “they do but jest – poison 
in jest” (3.2.229). Plays are effective because people normally think of them as trivial; thus, they 
circumvent the audience’s psychic defences, eliciting, for example, involuntary admissions of 
hidden guilt: “the play's the thing/ Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the King” (2.2.600-1). 
Just as “A knavish speech sleeps in a foolish ear” (4.3.22-3), a good play is “’a knavish piece of 
work” (3.2.234), mischievously deploying irony (“Marry, this is miching malicho. It means 
mischief” [3.2.135]), “That’s wormwood” [3.2.176]) and testing its auditors’ wit.  
And yet, despite these adaptations to a corrupt world, dramatic language may serve as a 
powerful instrument of truth, holding the mirror up to nature (3.2.20-3). One cannot, of course, 
take its truth for granted or construe it simplistically. As Kernan writes, the meaning of the 
internal plays in Hamlet are deeply ambiguous, and they demonstrate “that plays can be used to 
conceal truth as well as reveal it, and that they can be used to manipulate reality for base 
purposes as noble ones.”34 While it is a cliché that mirrors tell us the objective truth about 
ourselves, we all know that mirrors can be arranged in such a manner as to deceive sight. Yet 
theatrical language  has, in addition to its indirection and modesty, an advantage over ordinary 
                     
34 Kernan, Playwright, 109-10. 
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discourse. The merely verbal may degenerate into “words, words, words” (2.2.192), while the 
merely gestural, like the dumb show which precedes “The Mousetrap,” may leave its audience in 
a state of incomprehension (3.2.134). As Hannah Arendt argues in The Human Condition, 
“Speechless action would no longer be action because there would no longer be an actor, and the 
actor, the doer of deeds, is possible only if he is at the same time the speaker of words. The 
action he begins is human disclosed by the word...”35 Words are not in themselves enough, nor 
are actions, but perhaps a disciplined synthesis of word and action can reliably represent internal 
and external reality, and drama is precisely such a synthesis: “Suit the action to the word, the 
word to the action” (3.2.17).    
Homo histrio provides a more nuanced and plausible conception of the self than homo 
rationalis, mediating once again between the ideals of Pico and the critique of Montaigne. The 
self is neither, as Pico would have it, a rigid hierarchy with reason on top, nor a chaotic torpor as 
Montaigne depicts it, but rather a dynamic equilibrium in which various human faculties, the 
irrational and corporeal included, cooperate, taking predominant roles in turn. In theatrical terms, 
one might call the self an ‘ensemble piece’ rather than a ‘star-turn’ for rationality. Plays are 
certainly the products of human rationality; common Elizabethan synonyms for play and plot are 
“argument” (2.2.352; 3.2.136) and “question” (2.2.354; 3.1.42-3), terms drawn from the 
rhetorical lexicon. Yet theatre, for both performers and audiences, equally engages the emotions. 
Upon arrival, the First Player is asked to deliver “a passionate speech” (2.2.427) which is 
nevertheless delivered “with good accent and good discretion” (2.2.461-2). As the speech 
progresses, the player’s performance becomes increasingly passionate and intense, so that 
Polonius finds the display of emotion unseemly: “Look whe’er he has not turned his colour and 
                     
35 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition,  (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958),  
178-9.
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has tears in’s eyes. Prithee no more” (2.2.515-6). Hamlet’s response gets closer to the heart of 
the matter: 
O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I! 
Is it not monstrous that this player here, 
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion, 
Could force his soul to his own conceit 
That from her working all his visage wanned; 
Tears in his eyes, distraction in his aspect, 
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting  
With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing, 
For Hecuba!  
What's Hecuba to him or he to Hecuba,  
That he should weep for her?  
(2.2.545-53) 
Hamlet contrasts his own inadequate reaction to the seduction of his mother and the murder of 
his father with the actor’s remarkable emotional identification with Hecuba, a mere fictional 
character. He goes on to amplify the contrast first by accusing himself of apathy, then by 
indulging in a fit of uncontrolled rage, and finally by reproaching himself for losing his temper at 
all. If we look at the scene emblematically, we see that homo histrio (in the person of the First 
Player) succeeds in achieving what homo rationalis (in the person of Hamlet) cannot: a 
satisfying emotional release in the context of affective discipline and harmony. He succeeds, not 
through philosophical reflection or mere repression, but through the exercise of imagination or 
“conceit” (2.2.547, 551), which directs the player’s entire being -- soul, voice, facial expressions, 
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bodily gestures -- toward the rational end of representation. This is precisely the balance Hamlet 
recommends in his advice to the players and often lacks in himself: “in the very torrent, tempest, 
and as I may say, whirlwind of your passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may 
give it smoothness.... Be not too tame neither, but let your own discretion be your tutor” (3.1.5, 
16-7). That is, homo histrio recuperates homo rationalis’s objective of passional discipline 
through a different set of means. 
One common sense objection to this is that the actor’s passions are “fake” and those of 
Hamlet “real.” Yet the play confounds this distinction: “What would he do/ Had he the motive 
and the cue for passion/  That I have? He would drown the stage with tears,/ And cleave the 
general ear with horrid speech, / Make mad the guilty, and appal the free,/ Confound the 
ignorant, and amaze indeed/ The very faculties of eyes and ears” (2.2.554-60). Though he is 
ostensibly contending for the depth and authenticity of his own passion, Hamlet puts himself and 
the player on the same footing by using theatrical terms like “motive” and “cue,” and by 
imagining a theatrical representation of his emotional turmoil. Moreover, repeatedly, the 
unrestrained indulgence of Hamlet’s putatively authentic emotions produces melodramatic over-
acting, such as his volcanic self-reproach (2.2.561-78), his murderous rage toward, and 
outrageous rebuke of, Gertrude (3.2.379-90; 3.4.65-101), and his ranting attempt to outdo 
Laertes’s grief over Ophelia’s death (5.1.247-79). That is, Hamlet is guilty of precisely the sort 
of “o’erdone” performances against which he cautions the players prior to “The Murder of 
Gonzago”: “O, it offends me to the soul to hear a robustious, periwig-pated fellow tear a passion 
to tatters, to very rags, to split the ears of the groundlings.... I would have such a fellow whipped 
for o'erdoing Termagant. It out-Herods Herod. Pray you avoid it” (3.2.8-14). Thus, the line 
between authenticity and inauthenticity, between being and seeming, is blurred. Is Hamlet 
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“really” ready to “drink hot blood” (3.2.381) or does his love for Ophelia “genuinely” exceed 
that of 40,000 brothers (5.1.264-5). It is impossible to know for certain.  
Perhaps, the play implies, an obsessive concern with authenticity in defining the self is 
counter-productive, and one should be content merely to play one’s role with integrity and skill. 
Under the aspect of homo histrio, the self is neither a fixed, timeless unity nor a void. In playing 
a role, the actor engages in a form of self-fashioning, as Pico would have it, but it is not creation 
ex nihilo. In the formation of character, the actor enjoys a measured rather than boundless 
freedom; his choices are limited by a variety of factors: the dramatic text, theatrical convention, 
collaboration with other actors, and his own talent. The self, as exemplified by homo histrio, 
might be described as fluid and mutable, but this is not to say, as has sometimes been claimed, 
that that the actor has no identity whatsoever.36 As Richard Hornby observes, the recognition that 
human identities are not innate but are rather, like theatrical roles, relative, acquired, constructed, 
and revisable, does not therefore render the self an arbitrary fiction; in fact, people with a weak 
sense of identity generally make poor actors, while an actor with a strong sense of identity can 
afford a flexible ego boundary so that the “role extends his sense of self but does not displace 
it.”37 The acquisition of human character, as in Hamlet’s exhortation to Gertrude, is a 
disciplinary process involving imagination, imitation, and rehearsal: 
Assume a virtue, if you have it not. 
That monster custom, who all sense doth eat, 
Of habits devil, is angel yet in this, 
That to the use of action fair and good 
                     
36 Colin McGinn, for example, interprets the actor as a figure for what he variously calls 
Shakespeare’s pessimism, skepticism, nihilism, and naturalism. In a rather gross overstatement, 
he claims that, early in the play, Hamlet has no character whatsoever, and that he turns to acting 
to fill the abyss he finds within   (Philosophy, 15, 45-6, 49). 
37 Hornby, Metadrama, 71, 72, 113. 
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He likewise gives a frock or livery 
That aptly is put on. Refrain tonight, 
And that shall lend a kind of easiness 
To the next abstinence; the next more easy; 
For use almost can change the stamp of nature, 
And either curb the devil, or throw him out 
With wondrous potency.  
(3.4.162-72)  
The phrase “put on” suggests an actor putting on a mask or a costume, working from the external 
to the internal. Later, Hamlet describes in a letter to Horatio another theatrical assumption of 
virtue: “Finding ourselves too slow of sail, we put on a compelled valor, and in the grapple I 
boarded them” (4.6.17-8).  The key question, from the standpoint of homo histrio, is not, “Who 
am I, really?” but “What does the occasion require me to be?” The actor is committed to the 
principle of decorum or propriety, and must accordingly thread the needle between discretion 
and indiscretion, deliberation and rashness: “Rashly –/ And prais’d be rashness for it: let us 
know/ Our indiscretion sometime serves us well/ When our deep plots do pall..../ . . . .  / Being 
thus benetted round with villainies -- / Ere I could make a prologue to my brains,/ They had 
begun the play -- I sat me down, / Devised a new commission, wrote it fair” (5.2.4-9, 29-36).  
Plots, prologue, play – the passage is unquestionably metadramatic and a powerful counterpart to 
Hamlet’s earlier exhortation to the actors, “let your own discretion be your tutor” (3.2.16-7). 
Homo histrio recognizes that sometimes decorum requires performing the lines as they are set 
down in the script (3.2.38-9) but other times requires inspired improvisation. 
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Finally, homo histrio constitutes an imaginative solution to Hamlet’s anxieties about 
human agency or the lack thereof.  Hamlet longs for freedom and autonomy, and can imagine 
nothing worse than being a kind of musical instrument “played upon” by Fate, Fortune, or 
another human being. But, as the play demonstrates, not even the most eminent among us are 
free in the absolute sense; human nature is conditioned and the human will bounded by powerful 
determinative forces:  
…these men, 
Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect, 
Being nature’s livery or fortune’s star, 
His virtues else, be they as pure as grace,  
As infinite as man may undergo, 
Shall in the general censure take corruption  
From that particular fault. The dram of evil  
Doth all the noble substance often dout 
To his own scandal.  
(1.4.30-8) 
This tragic circumscription of individual will and agency is analogous to the actor being cast in a 
dramatic role; both constitute the imposition of a narrative destiny: “but heaven hath pleased it 
so,/ To punish me with this, and this with me,/ That I must be their scourge and minister” 
(3.4.175-7). Hamlet is evidently dissatisfied with his own role; he does not wish to play the 
clichéd revenger’s part, for which he is unsuited in terms of disposition and inclination. And if he 
must play the role, he wants to dictate the conditions of performance: that his actions be 
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honourable and just in his own eyes, and perspicuous to those who are “but mutes or audience to 
this act” (5.2.340):  
Report me and my cause aright 
To the unsatisfied. 
. . . .  
O God, Horatio, what a wounded name, 
Things standing thus unknown, shall I leave behind me.  
If thou didst ever hold me in thy heart,  
Absent thee from felicity awhile,  
And in this harsh world draw thy breath in pain 
To tell my story.  
(5.2.344-5, 349-54)  
Just as he interpolates “a speech of some dozen or sixteen lines” (2.2.535) into “The Murder of 
Gonzago” and, chorus-like, interrupts it (3.2.240), Hamlet attempts to rewrite the revenger’s role 
from within, imposing his will on recalcitrant materials and questioning the assumptions on 
which the revenge play is based.  Rather than perform the role according to the standard cultural 
“script,” Hamlet resists and delays. He monologues incessantly, bringing the action to a 
standstill. In the scene where he refrains from killing the praying Claudius, Hamlet not only 
delays, but appears to usurp the role of cosmic playwright by judging Claudius’s inner 
motivations and insisting that he be eternally damned for his crimes (3.3.73-96). Yet these 
resistance efforts are largely futile, producing a string of lost opportunities, blind alleys, and 
unintended disasters.  
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The question of agency is tentatively resolved, however, after Hamlet returns from the 
sea voyage. As Marjorie Garber notes, instead of speaking soliloquies full of questions, 
conditionals, infinitives, and passive constructions, Hamlet now engages in dialogue with others, 
and his language is full of active “doing” verbs.38  More importantly, he apparently ceases to 
“write” the play from within and accepts the more limited role of being “directed” by 
Providence: “There’s a divinity that shapes our ends,/ Rough-hew them how we will” (5.2.9-10); 
“even in that was heaven ordinant” (5.2.48); “There is a special providence in the fall of a 
sparrow....The readiness is all” (5.2.215-6, 218). As Maynard Mack observes in his classic essay 
“The World of Hamlet,” 
Till his return from the voyage he had been trying to act beyond these, had been 
encroaching on the role of Providence, ....He had been too quick to take the 
burden of the whole world and its condition upon his limited and finite self. Faced 
with a task of sufficient difficulty in its own right, he had dilated it into a cosmic 
problem -- as indeed every task is, but if we think about this too precisely we 
cannot act at all...Hamlet has sought to play at God....Now, he has learned that 
there are limits to the before and after that human reason can comprehend.....[T]he 
roles of life are not entirely self-assigned....Hamlet is ready now for what may 
happen, seeking neither to foreknow it nor avoid it.”39   
 I do not mean to suggest that homo histrio is an all-purpose solution to the enigma of 
human nature in Hamlet, a play whose complexity and richness are inexhaustible. Hamlet 
himself appears to warn the would-be critic to beware of reductive interpretations which presume 
                     
38 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All,  (New York: Anchor Books, 2004),  502. 
39 Maynard Mack, “The World of Hamlet,” Shakespeare: Modern Essays in Criticism, Rev. Ed., 
Ed. Leonard F. Dean, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 260. See as well Kernan, 
Playwright, 109-10. 
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to know the unknowable: “Why look you now, how unworthy a thing you make of me! You 
would play upon me, you would seem to know my stops, you would pluck out the heart of my 
mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to the top of my compass....`Sblood, do you 
think I am easier to be played upon than a pipe? Call me what instrument you will, though you 
can fret me, you cannot play upon me” (3.2.371-80). Within the play, there are obvious failures 
of theatricality as a strategy, and the players are not held up as paragons.40 But in fact this 
evident imperfection makes homo histrio more representative than homo rationalis in an age of 
indeterminacy where radical critique like Montaigne’s was unsettling established patterns of 
thought. As Hornby argues, the signature metadramatic trope – the play within the play – 
engenders perceptual estrangement by inviting the theatrical audience to consider their own 
existence as illusionary and thus tends to be widely used during periods when root notions are 
being questioned and challenged. 41Homo histrio, as Hamlet depicts it, is a figure which mediates 
between optimistic and pessimistic perspective on human nature, providing a modest and 
tentative solution to the human enigma in an age of uncertainty, “grounds/ More relative” 
(2.2.599-600), not absolute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
40 See for example, Hamlet’s anti-theatrical “heckling” of the players during “The Mousetrap” 
(3.2.135, 137-42, 147, 246-8). 
41 Hornby, Metadrama, 46, 180. 
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